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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

:
:

v.

:

RANDOLPH CARPENTER,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 990494-CA

Priority No. 2

:
BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE CASE
Defendant appeals his conviction of one count of possession of a controlled
substance (cocaine), a second-degree felony under Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-82 (1998).
This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (Supp. 1998).
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Where no meritorious grounds for suppression of evidence
existed, was defendant denied effective assistance of counsel when
his trial counsel failed to file a motion to suppress or a
memorandum supporting defendant's pro se motion?

An ineffective assistance of counsel claim raised for the first time on appeal is
reviewed as a matter of law. See State v. Snvder. 860 P.2d 351, 354 (Utah App. 1993);
State v. Strain. 885 P.2d 810, 814 (Utah App. 1994); State v. Cosey. 873 P.2d 1177,1179

(Utah App. 1994). However, "[djespite the application of a standard normally bereft of
deference, appellate review of trial counsel's performance must be highly deferential;
otherwise, the 'distorting effects of hindsight9 would produce too great a temptation for
courts to second-guess trial counsel's performance" based on a lifeless record. State v.
Tennvson, 850 P.2d 461,466 (Utah App. 1993) (citation omitted). See also Snvder, 860
P.2d at 354: State v. Strain. 885 P.2d 810, 814 OJtah App. 19941
2.

Did the trial court correctly rely on a drug enforcement agent's
testimony infindingthat defendant had possession of a black box
found to contain crack cocaine?

:%
--«?••

{

s

"We review the factual findings underlying a trial court's ruling on a motion to

{

suppress under a clearly erroneous standard.... We review the trial court's conclusions
based on the totality of those facts for correctness." State v. Struhs, 940 P.2d 1225, 122627 (Utah App. 1997) (citation omitted); see also State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935-40
(Utah 1994); State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1271 (Utah 1993); State v. Ribe, 876 P.2d
i

403,405 (Utah App. 1994);.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Rule 24(a)(9), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, provides as follows:
(9) An argument. The argument shall contain the contentions and reasons of
the appellant with respect to the issues presented, including the grounds for
reviewing any issue not preserved in the trial court, with citations to the
authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on. A party challenging a
fact finding must first marshal all record evidence that supports the
challenged finding.

^

<

2

i

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I U It IU! mi was clian I'd w ith oiu i oiml ol dlegall possession of a controlled
substance with intent to distribute. The offense occurred within 1,000 feet of a park, and
was a first-degree felony under Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (1998).
Defendant filed a pro se Motion to Suppress evidence (R. 160-81) Af ter a
hearing, ihc trial i ouil denied the motion «K IH2-8S, hil a! KKi Delanlanl snhset|iiently
pled guilty to second-degree felony illegal possession of a controlled substance (R. 201).
The trial court sentenced defendant to one to 15 years in prison (R. 224-25).
Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal (R. 229-30,232).
• •• S I A rEMEN'
\ s Agent Sean Hamblin lead a team of narcotics agents toward the door of an
Ogden crack house, he saw a man peering out of the window (R. 261 at 4). Knowing that
the drugs the officers were after could quickly disappear into the septic system, he yelled
out to his fellon of fleets thai someone had seen Ihetu ll< Jhl ai >)

. • :-• ,

1 he officers moved fast. Hamblin kicked the door, and Agent Troy Burnett, right
behind him, hit it with a battering ram (R. 261 at 5). 2 The door flew open (id.). Hamblin
headed immediately toward the back of the house, hoping to secure the bathroom before

^ i c facts are taken from the suppression hearing transci ipt (R 261)
2

In strike-force parlance, Hamblin, being the first officer to the door, was the
"screen," and Burnett, who wielded the battering ram, was the "key" (R. 261 at 56).

3

anyone inside flushed the drugs (R. 261 at 6, 28). Five to ten other officers charged
through the door after him (R. 261 at 10, 23). r
Agent Burnett shouted, "Police search warrant, I want to see your hands. Get
down on the floor" (R. 261 at 31). Burnett and Agent Nathan Jensen covered the living
room (R. 261 at 29). Burnett was familiar with the layout of the rooms, having
participated in a raid on the house two months earlier (R. 281 at 24).

:

When Jensen saw Burnett sweep to the left side of the room, he automatically

^

(

turned to the right, in accordance with his training in conducting drug raids (R. 261 at 58).
Jensen saw defendant sitting on a couch at the end of the room with a black object in his
left hand (R. 59). Believing the object might be a weapon, the officer "fixated" on the
object (R. 261 at 59-60). The officer recalled that "[a]s I'm coming in, I'm ordering him .
to the ground" (R. 261 at 60). Defendant immediately complied (R. 261 at 62). In
Jensen's words, "He's got [the object] in his hand. He stands up and (inaudible) he goes
to the ground and he kind of drops it and throws it and it rolls . . . off to his left near the

*

edge of the coffee table" (R. 261 at 60, 75). Jensen walked around to thefrontof
defendant to make sure he could see defendant's hands and to determine whether the

,

object was a weapon (R. 261 at 61). Jensen realized that the object, which lay one or two
feet from defendant's hand, was a box (id).
Jensen called out "Finder!" to alert Burnett that he had found something (R. 261 at
63). Burnett was the designated "finder" during the search (R. 261 at 63). When
<

4

executing a warrant, the officers did not touch evidence they located (R. 261 at 38).
Instead,, they called out In llic lintlci who tolleital .mull in\ tTi tonal Ihr e\ \tkm i
refolding the h H ation when; it w as found (R. 261 at 38,50). The finder then turned the
evidence over to the evidence custodian, who filled out the return of service and packaged
the evidence for booking into police custody (R. 261 at 38, 66). Here, Jensen was the
evidence custodian (R 261 at 56,66).
• While JrnstTi focused on ddhidlaiii Biinielf secured three individuals who had .
been sitting on a couch on the left side of the living room (R. 261 at 29-30). Quentin
Jones and two females obeyed Burnett's orders to hit the ground (R. 261 at 31, 33).
Burnett handcuffed Jones (K
• Whui BiiiTiill si

•

'

defendai it 1/y ing on the floor

one-and-a-half to two feet away from the black box (R. 261 at 31, 35). Jensen told
Burnett that he saw defendant drop the box on the ground (R. 261 at 76).
Hearing Jensen's words, defendant volunteered "It's not mine" (id.).
Buntd! linn Lnt up flu.- box (R /('ill <il M) III was, a 2" or V h\ ,)" hin^'il plastic .
ring or jewelry box that "clicked open" (R. 261 at 37, 61). Burnett and Jensen opened the
box and found four to six yellowish-white rocks inside (R. 261 at 52, 64). Jensen set up
his field-testing materials on the coffee table and found that the rocks tested positive for
cocaiiii (R, 2d I ill IX„ fvl).

;

, ' •' • • '••'••">•
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"

. . - . - .

Agent Hamblin found Shelly Perks in the bedroom (R. 261 at 7). She told him she
w a s in the house to smoke crack and that she had purchased one rock from "Randolph"
(R. 261 at 7, 16). N o one else in the h o m e was named Randolph (R. 261 at 7,35).
Burnett took Quentin Jones outside to question him. Jones said he had just bought crack
from defendant (R. 261 at 34). W h e n Burnett asked where defendant kept the drugs,
Jones replied " H e has this little black container" (id,).

±*v.

Jensen filled out a booking sheet and probable cause statement in preparation for
transporting defendant to jail (R. 261 at 40, 66). Defendant asked what he would be

*

charged with (R. 261 at 40). W h e n told that he would be charged with possession of the
contents of the box, defendant reiterated " T h a t ' s not m y fucking b o x " (id.).
Defendant told the officer he did not live at the crack house. H e did not claim to .
o w n or lease it (R. 261 at 68, 70).
In his Motion to Suppress, defendant argued that no evidence existed to show he
owned, leased, or lived at the crack house. (R. 62-63, 70). The trial court apparently
agreed, ruling that he did not have standing to contest the search of the house (R. 184, 261
at 87; A d d e n d u m A ) . The trial court, however, ruled that he did have standing to
question the legality of the search of the b o x because the b o x had been in his possession
(id.). However, the court reasoned, the search was lawful because the officers were
authorized to search for drugs in any places where they might be found (R. 261 at 88,
A d d e n d u m A ) . Therefore, the court ruled, the warrant was broad enough to encompass

6

the search of the box (id.).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Point I. In accordance with rule 24, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, this
Court should decline to reach defendant's claims because defendant has failed to support
them with argument or applicable authority.
I1! ni (ill I I II I kdendani asserts that tie was denied effeetne assistance of coi insel
because his trial attorney did not file a motion to suppress, and neither supported
defendant's pro se motion with a memorandum nor replied to the state's memorandum in
opposition. Defendant has failed to meet his burden to demonstrate ineffective assistance.
Hi si defendant » .innut slum lhal Ihe onleonie ol the piocmlin^ HuiiU! have been
different if counsel had not committed the alleged errors. Here, there was no reasonable
likelihood of success on a motion to suppress premised on any arguable grounds. Second,
failure to file a futile motion does not constitute deficient performance. Since a
suppression motion could nnl ha\c <aieceeded in an e\enl dial t ounsel did null deuv
defendant effective assistance.
Point III. Defendant asserts that the trial court erred in finding that defendant had
possession of the black box because only one officer testified that defendant was holding
,i bhttk object nihil, n Ihe officers bursl mln llie mom Although defendant siali's Ilia! Illu
officers' testimony was in conflict, the record demonstrates the contrary. Finally,
although defendant asserts that the trial court erred in admitting Officer Jensen's

7

testimony that defendant had the object in his hand, he states no basis to conclude that the
testimony was inadmissible.
ARGUMENT
POINTI
DEFENDANT'S CLAIMS ARE INADEQUATELY BRIEFED
Defendant claims that he was denied effective assistance of counsel because his v
attorney failed to file a suppression motion. Appellant's Brief at 9. However, he does not

*T{

identify any issues which defense counsel should have asserted. In addition, he claims
that the trial court should have suppressed officers' testimony that defendant was in —
possession of the black box containing crack cocaine. Appellant's Brief at 12. However,
defendant fails to state why the testimony should have been suppressed. Defendant has
i

failed to support either of his claims with intelligible argument or relevant authority.
Rule 24(a)(9), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, requires an appellant's
argument to contain the "contentions and reasons of the appellant with respect to the

<

issues presented,... with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record
relied on." Utah's appellate courts have consistently declined to address inadequately

.

briefed issues because "a reviewing court is entitled to have the issues clearly defined
with pertinent authority cited and is not simply a depository in which the appealing party
i

may dump the burden of argument and research." State v. Bishop. 753 P.2d 439,450
(Utah 1988) (overruled in part on other grounds) (quoting Williamson v. OpsahL 416
8

i

N.E.2d 783, 784 (111. App. 198H): see also Burns v. Summerhavs. 927 P.2d 197, 199
(Utah App. 1996). "Utah courts routinely decline to consider inadequately briefed
arguments." State v. Bryant, 965 P.2d 539, 549 (Utah App. 1998); see also State v.
Wareham, 772 P.2d 960,966 (Utah 1989) (declining to address argument on the ground
that defendant's brief "wholly lacks legal analysis and authority to support his argument").
Because defendant has failed to support his claims with argument or pertinent
authority, the Court should decline to address them.
POINTII
DEFENSE COUNSEL DID NOT RENDER INEFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE BY FAILING TO FILE, OR TO SUPPORT
DEFENDANT'S FILING OF, A FUTILE MOTION TO SUPPRESS
Defendant claims that his trial counsel performed deficiently because he failed to
file a motion to suppress evidence, or to support defendant's pro se motion to suppress by
filing a supporting memorandum or a memorandum in reply to the State's response
opposing his motion. Appellant's Brief at 6. However, defendant does not specify what
his trial counsel should have asserted as grounds for the motion, and does not show that
counsel's alleged failures affected the outcome of the proceedings. Therefore, defendant
has failed to meet the two-pronged test set forth in Strickland v. Washington. 466 U.S.
668 (1984), for evaluating ineffective assistance of counsel claims brought under the
Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

9

Under the Strickland test,
First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient.
This requires showing that counsel was not functioning as the "counsel"
guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant
must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This
requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the
defendant of a fair trial.
State v. Seel. 827 P.2d 954,958 (Utah App. 1992) (citing State v. Montes. 804 P.2d 543,
545 (Utah App. 1991)(quoting Strickland. 466 U.S. at 687).
Defendant bears the burden of establishing ineffectiveness of counsel by
"demonstrable, not speculative" proof. State v. Malmrose. 649 P.2d 56, 58 (Utah 1982).
See also Codianna v. Morris. 660 P.2d 1101, 1109 (Utah 1983). Moreover, although
determination of whether defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel is a matter
of law which ordinarily is reviewed for correctness, appellate review of trial counsel's
performance must be "highly deferential in order to prevent the temptation to secondguess counsel's actions based on a lifeless record." State v. Snyder. 860 P.2d 351, 354
(Utah App. 1993); see also State v. Strain. 885 P.2d 810, 814 (Utah App. 1994); State v.
Cosev. 873 p.2d 1177,1179 (Utah App. 1994); State v. Tennvson. 850 P.2d 461,466
(Utah App. 1993).
To succeed in an ineffective assisstance of counsel claim, defendant must
overcome a "strong presumption that counsel's performance was adequate." State v.
Lovell. 1999 UT 40,146, 984 P.2d 382, 392; see also Strickland. 466 U.S. at 689; State
10

v. Tavlor. 947 P.2d 681,685 (Utah 1997). "Given the arduous nature of the defendant's
burden, ineffective assistance of counsel claims rarely succeed." State v. Snvder, 860
P.2d 351, 354 (Utah App. 1993).
A.

Defendant Has Failed to Demonstrate Prejudice,
In cases where it is "easier to dispose of an ineffective claim on the ground of lack

of sufficient prejudice,... that course should be followed." Strickland. 466 U.S. at 697;
see also State v. Arguelles. 921 P.2d 439,441 (Utah 1996); Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d
516, 523 (Utah 1994). To establish the prejudice prong of an ineffective assistance claim,
defendant must show that "but for the deficient representation, there is a 'reasonable
probability' that the result would have been different." State v. HalL 946 P.2d 712, 719
(Utah App. 1997) (citation omitted), cert, denied. 953 P.2d 449 (Utah 1998). "Prejudice
will be held to exist only where the error undermines our confidence in the verdict against
the defendant." State v. Snvder. 860 P.2d 351, 359 (Utah App. 1993). Thus, the Court
must decide if a reasonable probability exists that the outcome would have been more
favorable to defendant had trial counsel filed a motion to suppress, a memorandum
supporting defendant's pro se motion to suppress, or a reply to the state's memorandum
in opposition to defendant's motion to suppress.
In State v. SeeL 827 P.2d 954,958-59 (Utah App. 1992), this Court rejected the
defendants' claim that the trial counsel's failure to file a motion to sever the charge of

11

possession of a firearm by a restricted person, which requires proof that a defendant has a
prior record of a felony conviction, constituted ineffective assistance. Although the Court
felt the motion would probably have been granted if counsel had made a motion to sever
the charges requiring proof of prior crimes, the court nevertheless denied defendants'
claim of ineffective assistance because defendants did not provide a "persuasive
explanation of how severing the different charges would likely have produced a different
outcome." Id at 958.

VA.

* U

Here, defendant has not shown that counsel's filing of a motion, memorandum or
reply would have resulted in the suppression of any evidence. In fact, the record indicates
that the trial court conscientiously considered every conceivable argument in favor of
suppression- even arguments defendant did not raise.3 Given the court's careful
consideration of the issues, defendant fails to present in his brief any basis to conclude
that he was demonstrably prejudiced byfilingthe motion himself rather than being
assisted by trial counsel. Even if counsel had performed as defendant suggests he should

<

have performed, a different outcome would not have resulted.

•

:

<

i

defendant's motion focused on the admissibility of $ 182 removed from his
pockets, and on the fact that he did not reside at the crack house (R. 60-63, 68, 70, 76).
Defendant did not challenge the admissibility of the black box or the officers' testimony.
The trial court reached those issues despite defendant's failure to raise them (R. 184-85).

^

12

I

B.

Defendant Has Not Shown that Trial Counsel Performed Deficiently,
To establish that trial counsel performed deficiently, "the defendant must

overcome the presumption that under the circumstances, the challenged action 'might be
considered sound trial strategy.'" State v. Gallegos. 967 P.2d 973,977 (Utah App. 1998)
(quoting State v. Garrett. 849 P.2d 578, 579 (Utah App. 1993) (quoting Strickland. 466
U.S. at 689)). In that vein, "failure of counsel to make motions or objections which
would be futile if raised does not constitute ineffective assistance." Parsons. 871 P.2d at
525 (citation omitted) (counsel's failure to move for formal discovery does not show
prejudice). See also State v. Chacon. 962 P.2d 48, 51 (Utah 1998) (counsel's stipulating
to the admissibility of the evidence recovered at crime scene was not ineffective
assistance because objection would have been futile); State v. Buel. 700 P.2d 701, 703
(Utah 1985) (counsel's failure to challenge chain of custody was not ineffective
assistance because the issue was not meritorious and objection would have been futile)
Malmrose. 649 P.2d at 59 (trial counsel's failure to object to admission of testimony was
not ineffective assistance because doing so would have been futile); State v. Wright. 765
P.2d 12, 15 (Utah App. 1988) (failure to object to the admissibility of blood sample and
blood test results was not ineffective assistance because objection would have been
futile).
In State v. Seel. 827 P.2d 954 (Utah App. 1992), the defendants claimed counsel
was ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress the evidence found in his vehicle as

13

a result of the allegedly illegal stop, arrest, and search. This Court denied the defendant's
ineffective assistance claim stating "defendants have mentioned no basis for filing a
motion to suppress that would support granting that motion." Id, at 960.
Here, as in Seel defendant states no basis for filing a motion to suppress that
would support suppression. Defendant simply states that "[wjith the heavy burden on the
Defendant to successfully prepare . . . a motion to suppress, it was ineffective assistance
of counsel to necessitate the defendant to prepare his own motion to suppress. Further,
defense counsel was ineffective in not preparing and filing either a memorandum
supporting the defendant's pro se motion to suppress evidence . . . or a reply
memorandum to the State's memorandum opposing the defendant's motion to dismiss
[sic]." Appellant's Brief at 9. Defendant fails to show that a motion to suppressfiledby
trial counsel and based on any grounds would have been successful.
In short, defendant fails to meet his burden to show that defense counsel's
performance was objectively unreasonable.
POINTIII
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THAT DEFENDANT
WAS IN POSSESSION OF THE BLACK BOX AND CORRECTLY
ADMITTED OFFICER JENSEN'S TESTIMONY ON THAT POINT
Defendant asserts that "[t]he Trial Judge in stating that it is clear that the
Defendant had the box in his possession was mistaken as no officer ever testified to this.
. . . When the Court chose to believe the testimony of Officer Jensen over Officer Burnett

14

it was not a logical assumption." Appellant's Brief at 11. Defendant suggests that since
Agent Burnett, who entered the house before Agent Jensen, did not testify that he saw the
black object in defendant's hand, his testimony was necessarily in conflict with Agent
Jensen's testimony that he saw the object in defendant's hand. Id Defendant further
maintains that the trial court committed error in failing to suppress Agent Jensen's
testimony that defendant had the box in his hand when the officers entered the house.4

4

The heading of Point II of defendant's brief is titled "The Trial Court Committed
Reversible Error When it Ruled that the Defendant had no Standing to Contest the Search
Warrant, but that Evidence Obtained by Execution of the Search Warrant May be
Introduced into Evidence, the Weight of the Evidence to be Determined by the Jury."
Appellant's Brief at 10. However, the text of defendant's Point II does not discuss
standing. Instead, it appears to be devoted to whether the trial court erred in finding that
defendant had possession of the box where the officers' testimony was "in conflict" on
that point. Appellant's Brief at 11-12.
Since the State is unable to discern the nature of defendant's claims regarding
standing, the State is unable to meaningfully address such claims. However, it is clear
that the trial court correctly determined that defendant had no standing to contest the
search of the house. Where a defendant has neither a proprietary or possessory interest,
nor an expectation of privacy in the thing searched, there is no standing to challenge the
police action. Rakas v. Illinois. 439 U.S. 128, 134(1978). See also United State v.
Moffet. 84 F.3d 1291, 1293 (10th Cir. 1996). In order to assert any expectation of privacy
in the items seized, there must be "at least a claimed right to possession in the property"
in order to grant standing to challenge the legality of the search. State v. Constantino.
732 P.2d 125, 127 (Utah 1987).
As the trial court held, defendant did not have standing to question the legality of
the search of the house because he did not live at the house or have any proprietary or
possessory interest in the house. Defendant does not appear to challenge the trial court's
ruling that the black box was lawfully searched because the item was within the scope of
the search warrant (R. 185,261 at 88). However, the trial court could have upheld the
search on the alternative ground that the black box was lawfully searched because
defendant abandoned it by denying that it was his. Defendant had no expectation of
privacy in abandoned property. U.S. v. Garzon. 119 F.3d 1446, 1449 (10th Cir. 1997).
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Appellant's Brief at 12.
Contrary to defendant's statements, the testimony of Agent Jensen and Agent
Burnett was not in conflict, and the trial court did not "choose to believe the testimony of
Officer Jensen over Officer Burnett," as defendant alleges. Appellant's Brief at 11.
Viewed in the context of the execution of the search warrant, the officers' testimony is
perfectly consistent. The fact that Agent Burnett did not see defendant with the black box in his hand merely reflects the fact that Agent Jensen was the only officer focused on

-

defendant.
When the officers executed the warrant, they did not simply enter the house and
stand gawking. Instead, the record shows that each officer immediately embarked on a
separate task. Agent Hamblin went straight down the hall toward the bathroom. (R. 261
at 28). Agent Burnett made an immediate left-hand turn to cover the three individuals
sitting on the couch on the left side of the room (R. 261 at 28-29). As Agent Burnett
made a left-hand turn, Agent Jensen directed his attention to the right where he saw
defendant sitting on a couch with a black object in his left hand (R. 261 at 58-59). Agent
Jensen "fixated" on the black object because he suspected it might be a weapon (R. 261 at
59-60). He saw defendant drop or throw the black object as defendant hit the floor (R.
261 at 60). Agent Burnett noticed defendant and the black box for the first time only after
defendant was prostrate (R. 261 at 31-32). Agent Burnett did not see defendant with the
black box in his hand simply because his attention was focused elsewhere. There is no

16

conflict in the officers' testimony.
As to defendant's claim that the trial court should have suppressed Agent Jensen's
testimony that he saw defendant holding the black object later found to contain crack
cocaine, defendant has failed to state any basis for suppression. No basis is even arguable
from the record.
In sum, the trial court did not err infindingthat defendant was in possession of the
black box, and did not err in admitting Agent Jensen's testimony.
CONCLUSION
This Court should affirm defendant's conviction.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ) 7 ^

day of

ftl\/XApft^

2000.

JAN GRAHAM
ATTORNEY GENERAL
C ^MkOAAKA^ M . ^ W J V T S A
CATHERINE M. JOHNSON
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
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Addendum A

BRENDA J. BEATON, UBN 6832
WEBER COUNTY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE
2380 WASHINGTON BLVD., 2ND FLOOR
OGDEN, UTAH 84401
TELEPHONE: (801) 399-8377

IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY,

STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

,

^ ^

ggg, .»7 »S9
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiff,

|
Case No. 981903734

VS.

''

RANDOLPH CARPENTER

\

Judge W. BRENT WEST

Defendant.

The Court, after reviewing the motions, hearing testimonyfromAgents Hamblin, Burnett and
Jensen and receiving argument from the State, hereby makes the following findings of fact and
conclusions of law:
FINDINGS OF FACTS
1.

On August 13 and 14,1998, a night-time, no-knock search warrant was issued for a residence
located at 2534 Orchard #1 because agents of the Weber/Morgan Narcotics Strike Force
believed cocaine was being sold there. The warrant did not list any particular people to be
searched. Agent Nate Jensen ("Agent Jensen") wrote the search warrant. Judge Parley R.
Baldwin initially reviewed the warrant. Later the next day, Judge Stanton M. Taylor reviewed
the search warrant again because Agent Jensen did not include the night-time provisions.
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Agent Troy Burnett ("Agent Burnett") was familiar with the layout of the home because he
had been to the apartment on a prior occasion with Agent Mike Donehoo. Before executing
the search warrant, the agents reviewed the layout of the home and set up a general plan for
entering the apartment. ^
When the agents executed the search warrant on August 14,1998 at approximately
9:30 p.m., Agent Shawn Hamblin ("Agent Hamblin") noticed an African-American male
peeking out the livingroom window. Agent Hamblin alerted the other agents that someone
in the house had seen them approaching. Agent Hamblin quickly approached thefrontdoor.
He kicked the door while Agent Burnett used the battering ram to break down the door.
Agent Hamblin entered the apartment first and immediately went toward the rear of the
apartment where the bathroom and bedroom are located.
Agent Burnett's attention was directed at the individuals seated on the north west couch.
Quinton Jones and two females were sitting on the couch. Jones appeared to be shoving
something under the cushions of the couch.
Agent Jensen's attention was directed to another couch located against the west wall where
the Defendant had been sitting.
Agent Anthony Hanson ("Agent Hanson") went directly to the bathroom area of the home.
While the Defendant was in the process of getting on the ground, Agent Jensen noticed a
black box in his left hand. Agent Jensen saw the Defendant throw the small black box. The
black box was located approximately one to two feetfromthe Defendant's left hand near the
coffee table.
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Agent Jensen called for Agent Burnett who was the designated finder for that search. Agent
Burnett noted the box was approximately one foot infrontof the Defendant's outstretched
arms.
Prior to the search of the box, the Defendant told Agent Jensen the box was not his. Either
Agent Burnett or Jensen opened the box and found it contained various yellow rocks that
were later determined to be cocaine.
After the search of the box, the Defendant told Agent Burnett "that fucking box is not mine."
The Defendant's name was found on written documents located in the bedroom.
None of the other individuals found in the home live at the residence. The agents did not find
any personal effects or documents for any of the other people located in the home.
Agent Hamblin interviewed Shelly Perkes at the home. She told Agent Hamblin she had
come to the house to purchase and use crack cocaine. She told Agent Hamblin that she
purchased a rock of cocainefroma male in the house named "Randolph." The Defendant is
the only person in the home with the name "Randolph."
Agent Burnett spoke with Quinton Jones out on thefrontporch. Agent Burnett was already
aware of the contents of the black box when he talked to Jones. Jones stated that he bought
two rocks from "Randolph" shortly before the agents entered the home.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The Defendant does not have standing to contest the search of the home.
The Defendant has standing to contest the search of the box because it was seen in his hand.
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3,

The search warrant permitted the officers to search any object that could possibly contain
cocaine or paraphernalia. The box fell within the scope of the search warrant.

4.

The agents' search of the black box was proper.

On February 12,1999, this Court denied the Defendant's Motion to Suppress the evidence
found in the black box. This matter is continued for February 17,1999 at 9:00 a.m. for the setting
of a jury trial.
DATED this J ! l ! l . day of February, 1999.

fo-EgfaSJUDGE W. BRENT WEST
Second Judicial District Court
Prepared by:

r^imna Q

/

Brenda J. Beaton /
[
Deputy Weber County Attorney

John Caine
Attorney for the Defendant
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whole speech?

Thank you.

We'll submit it.

THE COURT: All right.
rule on the matter.

The Court is prepared to

The issue of standing in regards to

the house seems to me to be fairly clear.

I'm of the

opinion that Mr. Carpenter, based on what I've heard, did
not, would not have standing to question the search of
the home in this particular situation.
In regards to the item of the black box, it is
a difficult situation.

It is unclear whether or not he

is the owner of the box.
box in his possession.

It is clear that he had the

The search occurred immediately

after his possession of the box.

I think that gives him

standing to question the legality of that particular
search.
On the other hand, though, I do agree with you,
Ms. Beaton, it becomes a factual issue as to whether or
not the State can, in fact, prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that he possessed that with the intent to
distribute as it's been indicated there and I think it's
an issue that does go to the jury.
Looking at the Motion to Suppress, the officer
testified that Mr. Carpenter had that box in his hand.
He told him to hit the ground, he hit the ground and
whether he cast it aside or whether it came out of his
hand when he hit the ground or whatever, the box rolled
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out, it was about a foot, a foot and a half away.

The

officers then went over, explored and looked inside the
box.
I am of the opinion that the search warrant was
broad enough, they were at this house to look
particularly for objects that could have contained drugs.
They did not search Mr. Carpenter because they didn't
have any ability to search persons that they were
expected to find.

They were entitled to search objects.

They searched the box pursuant to a warrant that allowed
them to be there and inside it they found cocaine.

I

think it simply is the Motion to Suppress is denied.

I

do think it's a factual issue that goes to the jury as to
whether or not Mr. Carpenter possessed that sufficiently-*
to show an intent to distribute.
Ms. Beaton, you'll prepare the Findings of
Facts, Conclusions of Law and the denial of the Motion is
suppressed.
MS. BEATON: I will.
THE COURT:

Thank you.

MS. BEATON: Your Honor, we need to set this for
jury trial.

I don't have the trial schedule.

MR. CAINE: Can we, I don't either.

Can we put

this on the calendar for Wednesday and then we'll come
over and then we can set the trial date.
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